Search results for "mathematical economics"
showing 10 items of 240 documents
Stackelberg Equilibrium with Many Leaders and Followers. The Case of Setup Costs
2016
I provide conditions that guarantee that a Stackelberg game with a setup cost and an integer number of leaders and followers has an equilibrium in pure strategies. The main feature of the game is that when the marginal follower leaves the market the price jumps up, so that a leader’s payoff is neither continuous nor quasiconcave. To show existence I check that a leader’s value function satisfies the following single crossing condition: When the other leaders produce more the leader never accommodates entry of more followers. If demand is strictly logconcave, and if marginal costs are both non decreasing and not flatter than average costs, then a Stackelberg equilibrium exists. Besides showi…
Damping in quantum love affairs
2011
In a series of recent papers we have used an operatorial technique to describe stock markets and, in a different context, {\em love affairs} and their time evolutions. The strategy proposed so far does not allow any dumping effect. In this short note we show how, within the same framework, a strictly non periodic or quasi-periodic effect can be introduced in the model by describing in some details a linear Alice-Bob love relation with damping.
Consensus in inventory games
2008
This paper studies design, convergence, stability and optimality of a distributed consensus protocol for n-player repeated non cooperative games under incomplete information. Information available to each player concerning the other players' strategies evolves in time. At each stage (time period), the players select myopically their best binary strategy on the basis of a payoff, defined on a single stage, monotonically decreasing with the number of active players. The game is specialized to an inventory application, where fixed costs are shared among all retailers, interested in reordering or not from a common warehouse. As information evolves in time, the number of active players changes t…
On Ibn Ezra's Procedure and Shapley Value
2014
We examine ibn Ezra's procedure (Rabinovitch 1973; O'Neill 1982) historically used to solve the Rights Arbitration problem in the general framework of bankruptcy problems. When the greatest claim is larger than or equal to the estate, the procedure is a maximal game (Aumann 2010). However, when the greatest claim is smaller than the estate, the axioms of efficiency (the whole estate is distributed) and satiation are difficult to satisfy simultaneously. We discuss both axioms to show that their importance and necessity are radically different. From then, for the part of the estate not covered by the greatest claim, we examine four possible procedures: the minimal overlap rule, Alcalde et al.…
On a stochastic SIR model
2007
We consider a stochastic SIR system and we prove the existence, uniqueness and positivity of solution. Moreover the existence of an invariant measure under a suitable condition on the coefficients is studied.
Distributed Consensus in Noncooperative Inventory Games
2009
This paper deals with repeated nonsymmetric congestion games in which the players cannot observe their payoffs at each stage. Examples of applications come from sharing facilities by multiple users. We show that these games present a unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium that dominates all other Nash equilibria and consequently it is also the social optimum among all equilibria, as it minimizes the sum of all the players’ costs. We assume that the players adopt a best response strategy. At each stage, they construct their belief concerning others probable behavior, and then, simultaneously make a decision by optimizing their payoff based on their beliefs. Within this context, we provide a …
Enseñanza de las ciencias : revista de investigación y experiencias didácticas
1996
Resumen basado en el de la publicación Resumen en inglés La evolución histórica del principio de Le Chatelier está relacionada con su uso en el aula de química. La aparente simplicidad en la cual el principio de Le Chatelier fue formulado por primera vez y el éxito logrado en la implementación de algunos procesos industriales importantes le dio un reconocimiento inicial que aún perdura. Sin embargo, desde el comienzo de este siglo, diferentes autores han señalado el carácter limitado de la regla cualitativa y su formulación vaga y ambigua. Además, la termodinámica dada por el Principio de Le Chatelier en algunas formulaciones cuantitativas limitan su aplicabilidad. Sin embargo, la mayoría d…
Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game
2011
The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in the context of a game, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, not only evolution but also efficiency may prefer impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the wrong populations.
A Critical View of Neurofeedback Experimental Designs: Sham and Control as Necessary Conditions
2016
C l i n M e d International Library Citation: Alino M, Gadea M, Espert R (2016) A Critical View of Neurofeedback Experimental Designs: Sham and Control as Necessary Conditions. Int J Neurol Neurother 3:041 Received: January 29, 2016: Accepted: February 25, 2016: Published: February 27, 2016 Copyright: © 2016 Alino M, et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. ISSN: 2378-3001 Volume 3 | Issue 1 Alino et al. Int J Neurol Neurother 2016, 3:041
Reciprocal vs nonreciprocal trade agreements: Which have been best to promote exports?
2019
The Doha Development Agenda recognizes the central role that international trade can play in the promotion of economic development. In fact, the increase of exports from developing countries to developed nations' markets has been considered a key element for developing countries to realize the potential benefits of globalization. Over the last decades, developed countries have provided preferential access to their markets to developing countries through nonreciprocal trade agreements. Moreover, developing countries have also participated in reciprocal trade agreements. This paper re-examines comparatively the effect of both kinds of trade agreements on exports from developing countries but …